Purpose. Jurors' religious characteristics are related to death penalty attitudes and verdicts. Jurors' religious characteristics might also relate to endorsements of aggravating circumstances (aggravators) and mitigating circumstances (mitigators)-factors that make a defendant more or less deserving of the death penalty, respectively. The purpose of this research was to assess the extent to which religious fundamentalism was related to endorsement and weighing of aggravators and mitigators and subsequent death penalty decisions while controlling for relevant religious and demographic characteristics.
Religion has a long-standing relationship with law, including the development of law (Berman, 1983) and the guidance of legal decision-making (McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 2005) . One area of interest includes how religion relates to jurors' decisions. Jury trials provide a facilitative environment for religious beliefs to guide jurors' decisions because jury trials typically include a judgement of right *Correspondence should be addressed to Logan A. Yelderman, Psychology Department, Prairie View A&M University, PO Box 519 MS 2600, Prairie View, TX 77446, USA (email: layelderman@pvamu.edu).
or wrong based on an evaluation and interpretation of information. Judgements of right and wrong or good and bad permeate religious beliefs and are understandably consulted when jurors are asked to make such judgements in a court of law (Vidmar & Hans, 2007; Wilkins, 2014) . Because of this intersection between personal beliefs and evaluations of the wrongfulness of others' acts, the purpose of the current research is to examine the extent to which religious beliefs, particularly religious fundamentalism, relate to evidence evaluations and death penalty decision-making.
The death penalty trial scheme Capital trials are unique in several ways. First, prospective capital jurors experience 'death qualification', involving judges and/or attorneys questioning prospective jurors concerning their death penalty attitudes and whether they can impartially evaluate evidence and reach a decision (Morgan v. Illinois, 1992; Wainwright v. Witt, 1985; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968) . Second, capital trials are bifurcated. In the first phase, jurors determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and if the defendant is found guilty in the first phase, jurors then determine an appropriate sentence (i.e., life sentence or death penalty) in the second phase. Third, capital jurors evaluate and weigh aggravators and mitigators (i.e., circumstances that make a crime more or less worthy of the death penalty, respectively) when making their sentencing decision (i.e., death or life sentence; Gregg v. Georgia, 1976) .
In general, the number of aggravators and mitigators accepted by the jury predicts the likelihood of a death sentence (Baldus, Woodworth, Grosso, & Christ, 2002; Richards, Bjerregaard, Cochran, Smith, & Fogel, 2016) . Similarly, when there are more aggravators than mitigators in a simulated death penalty case, mock jurors are more likely to render a death sentence and vice versa (Miller & Bornstein, 2006) . However, the process of evaluating aggravators and mitigators is often influenced by people's motivations or beliefs (Butler & Moran, 2007; Ghoshray, 2013; Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988; Morgan & Mannheimer, 2009 ). This likely includes religious beliefs, as religious ideology often provides people with behavioural and moral standards (e.g., perceptions of culpability and punishment recommendations; see Miller, Singer, & Jehle, 2008) . Thus, the current research focuses on the indirect association between religious beliefs, specifically fundamentalism, and death penalty sentencing decisions via evaluations and weighing of aggravators and mitigators.
Religious beliefs, legal attitudes, and legal decisions Bornstein and Miller (2009) suggest that people's religious characteristics (i.e., affiliations, beliefs, and orientations) are particularly relevant to capital juror decision-making. Although there are likely differences between religious affiliations (Bjarnason & Welch, 2004; Wozniak & Lewis, 2010) , there are also differences within religious affiliations (e.g., Britt, 1998) . It is possible that these differences between and within affiliations arise as a result of individual differences in specific religious beliefs. For example, religious fundamentalism, a literal interpretation of the Bible, a harsher (or more punitive) image of God, and experiencing religious re-birth are associated with increased support for the death penalty, whereas devotionalism, evangelism, religious salience, and forgiveness are associated with reduced support for the death penalty (Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, & Vander Ven, 2000; Grasmick, Bursik, & Blackwell, 1993; Leiber & Woodrick, 1997; Miller & Hayward, 2008; Miller, Maskaly, Peoples, & Sigillo, 2014; Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Young, 1992) . Understanding the relationship between religion and death penalty decision-making is better served by examining jurors' specific religious beliefs rather than broad categorical distinctions between religious affiliations.
Religious-based social and moral identities Jurors' religious beliefs might act as a lens through which they evaluate physical evidence, testimony, and trial actors (Devine, 2012; Haney, 2005) . Such religious beliefs provide a foundation for interpreting the morality of behaviour (Saroglou, 2011) . According to identity theory, one's own moral reasoning likely ties a person's selfconstrued morality to behaviour (Hardy & Carlo, 2011) . For religious individuals, morality comes from, or is at least shaped by, religious beliefs. According to the social identity approach, it is possible that religious-based morality is attached to a social identity pertaining to religion, and when this identity is engaged and becomes salient, a person is more likely to behave in ways consistent with that particular religious identity and moral code (Hogg, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . Moreover, religious-based morality might also be activated, dependent upon the situation and personal importance, through one's moral identity (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009) .
Religious and moral identities are likely activated to the extent the identity is accessible and fits the situation (Aquino et al., 2009; Oakes, 1987) . Thus, situations that cue thoughts about religion or morality might cue such identities and simultaneously religious-based moral beliefs. Death penalty trials provide an exemplary platform for both moral and religious thinking. Death penalty trials include decisions of both right and wrong and life and death, which both arguably define morality, at least in some regard, and likely activate religious and moral identities. Therefore, death penalty trials provide an avenue for religious jurors to evaluate defendants, evidence, and other information from the perspective of their religious-based moral reasoning.
Religious fundamentalism and evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
Religious fundamentalism is the belief in a single divine God, Biblical truth, sinful human nature, and free will (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) . Fundamentalism is positively related to death penalty support and general punitiveness (Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel, 1993; Miller & Hayward, 2008; Vogel, 2003; Yelderman & Miller, 2016) . In one study, Yelderman and Miller (2017) found that priming fundamentalist beliefs increased punitiveness in verdict and sentencing decisions in an insanity defence case. This suggests that fundamentalist beliefs provide a cognitive framework through which jurors evaluate evidence and trial information and render verdicts and sentences.
Religious fundamentalists might seek consistency in their beliefs about the appropriate punishment for murder (i.e., death) and their sentencing decisions (Unnever, Bartkowski, & Cullen, 2010; Unnever & Cullen, 2006) . The congruence between the two is likely motivated by their religious ideology (Kahan, 2013) , which might lead fundamentalists to seek out evidence supporting the death penalty (aggravators) and disregard evidence in opposition (mitigators; this general phenomenon is called confirmation bias or motivated reasoning; see Gilovich & Griffin, 2010; Kunda, 1990; Moskowitz, 2005) . Similarly, fundamentalists might place more value on evidence that aligns with a punitive agenda and less value on evidence opposing a punitive agenda.
Fundamentalist identities include an 'eye for an eye' doctrine, suggesting that the punishment for murder should be death (Grasmick, Cochran, et al., 1993; Miller, 2013; Miller & Hayward, 2008) . Therefore, evidence would be evaluated within this 'eye for an eye' framework. When weighing aggravators and mitigators to determine a sentence in a death penalty trial, fundamentalists' opposition towards mitigators and acceptance of aggravators might skew the decision in favour of death. This might even occur in cases with more mitigators than aggravators because fundamentalists might 'discount' or disregard mitigators. Therefore, death penalty trials likely evoke fundamentalists' religious and moral identities, facilitating the engagement of rigid ideological beliefs about crime and punishment, which then manifest in evidence evaluation and sentencing decisions.
Notably, fundamentalism might not be the only religious characteristic related to evaluations of aggravators and mitigators. Specifically, a person's internal motivation towards religious acts (intrinsic religiosity), devotion to religious beliefs and practices (devotionalism), belief in the general Christian tenets (orthodoxy), and inner sacredness (immanence) might also contribute to their evaluations of aggravators and mitigators (Allport & Ross, 1967; Bjarnason & Welch, 2004; Burris & Tarpley, 1998; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Miller, 2013; Putney & Middleton, 1961; Unnever et al., 2010; Young, 1992) .
Intrinsic religiosity is related to punitiveness towards vigilantes and weakened the relationship between fundamentalism and punitiveness (Miller, 2013; Yelderman & Miller, 2017) . Therefore, intrinsic religiosity might be related to less punitive sentences through the increased endorsement of mitigators and less endorsement of aggravators. Devotionalism is related to both punitiveness (Johnson, 1985) and leniency (Bjarnason & Welch, 2004; Unnever et al., 2010; Young, 1992) . Therefore, it is difficult to predict how devotionalism relates to death sentencing. Orthodoxy is often correlated with fundamentalism but sometimes has opposite predictions as fundamentalist beliefs are more rigid and involve more strict interpretation of the Bible and religious practices (Laythe et al., 2002; Shields, Miller, & Yelderman, 2018; Wulff, 1991) . However, because it is positively correlated, orthodoxy likely will be related to more punitive sentences and high endorsement of aggravators with lower endorsement of mitigators. Lastly, religious immanence is likely related to choosing a death sentence because it is related to punitiveness (Shields et al., 2018) . Beyond other religious beliefs, demographic factors are associated with death penalty attitudes. Specifically, higher rates of death penalty support tend to be found in males (Cochran & Sanders, 2009) , Whites (Britt, 1998; Unnever & Cullen, 2007) , older adults (Maggard, Payne, & Chappell, 2012) , and conservatives or republicans (Britt, 1998; Unnever & Cullen, 2006) . Thus, it is critical to control for these factors as well.
Overview and significance of the research The primary purpose of the current research is to examine the association between religious beliefs -specifically, religious fundamentalism -and evaluations of aggravators and mitigators and death penalty sentencing decisions while controlling for relevant religious characteristics and demographic factors. Study 1 examines whether or not religious beliefs relate to evaluations of aggravators and mitigators in a general, non-casespecific context. Study 2 builds upon the findings of Study 1 and examines whether and how evaluations of aggravators and mitigators mediate the relationship between religious beliefs and death penalty decisions. Participants act as mock jurors in a simulated capital trial based on a real case (State v. Daniels, 1994) , weigh aggravators and mitigators, and render a sentence.
The current research extends previous literature in three significant ways. First, this research is the first to test the weighing of aggravators and mitigators as the explanation between the fundamentalism and punitiveness link in death penalty decision-making. Prior to this research, no studies have examined why fundamentalism predicts punitive decision-making from an evidence evaluation approach. Understanding the role of the penalty phase evidence evaluation is absolutely necessary and up to this point unaddressed. Second, this research elucidates theoretical mechanisms as to why fundamentalism is related to punitive death penalty sentences and parses specific types of evidence as they relate to sentencing decisions. Third, the current research replicates previous studies on capital juror decision-making by using a mock juror paradigm and providing behavioural data (decision-making), rather than solely attitudinal data, supporting the fundamentalism-punitiveness link.
Overall, the current research provides new insights into psychology and law research by replicating previous research on the relationship between fundamentalism and death sentencing, testing new unstudied explanatory mechanisms, and proposing novel theoretical frameworks for these explanatory mechanisms. Though previous studies offer potential explanations for the link between fundamentalism and death sentencing, these explanations are based on assumptions and are not linked to theory. The current research both tests previous assumptions and attempts to link them to relevant theory.
STUDY 1
The purpose of Study 1 is to assess whether and how religious fundamentalism is related to general endorsement of aggravators and mitigators (Hypotheses 1 and 2) while controlling for other religious characteristics (i.e., orthodoxy, intrinsic religiosity, devotionalism, and immanence) and demographics. Study 1 hypotheses include:
1. Religious fundamentalism will be positively related to aggravator endorsement. 2. Religious fundamentalism will be negatively related to mitigator endorsement.
Study 1: Methods
Subjects Participants (N = 400) were students, self-identified as being religious, from a Western University. Participants averaged 20.8 years old (Mdn. = 19; SD = 4.5) and were 62.8% female, 65.3% White American (16.8% Hispanic American; 9.0% African American; 5.3% Asian American; and 0.3% Native American), 38.5% Catholic (24.0% Protestant; 31.3% Believe in God but have no particular religion; 2.5% Jewish; 1.3% Mormon; 0.8% Muslim, 0.5% Buddhist, 0.3% Hindu; and 0.8% other), and 31.3% republican (27.8% democrat; 12.0% independent; 27.3% no affiliation; and 1.8% other). An a priori power analysis a sample size of at least 242 participants was needed to detect a small to moderate effect. Thus, the current sample size is sufficient.
Procedures
Participants completed an online survey (approximately 30 min long) for course credit. They completed various measures regarding their aggravator and mitigator endorsement, religious characteristics, and demographic information. Participants were permitted to complete the survey upon their own time and convenience.
Dependent measures
Twelve aggravators and ten mitigators were adapted from North Carolina statute. The survey included the following instruction: 'An "aggravating circumstance" is a fact or group of facts, which tend to make a specific murder particularly deserving of the maximum punishment prescribed by law. The law identifies the aggravating circumstances, which might justify a sentence of death. That is, some factors make the defendant more worthy of receiving the death penalty. How much do you agree that the following factors are "aggravating circumstances"?' Mitigators were described with a similar instruction. Participants responded on a 5-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) for both aggravators and mitigators. Items were averaged into a single scale score for both aggravators (a = .95) and mitigators (a = .86; see Table 1 for scale statistics and Table 2 for means [Ms] and standard deviations [SDs] ).
Religious measures
The following scales were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and averaged across items to create a single measure score. Religious fundamentalism was measured using Altemeyer and Hunsberger's (2004) 12-item religious fundamentalism scale including statements such as, 'God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed' (a = .89). Intrinsic religiosity was measured using Gorsuch and McPherson's (1989) 8-item intrinsic religiosity scale including statements such as, 'I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs' (a = .77). Religious immanence was measured using Burris and Tarpley's (1998) 15-item immanence scale including statements such as, 'All religions have some value' (a = .76). The survey also included Putney and Middleton's (1961) devotionalism scale (6 items, such as, 'I very often think about matters relating to religion'; a = .88) and orthodoxy scale (6 items, such as, 'I believe that there is life after death'; a = .85). Note. AC = aggravating circumstances; DEVO = devotionalism; INT = intrinsic religiosity; MC = mitigating circumstances; ORTH = orthodoxy; RFS = religious fundamentalism; RI = religious immanence.
Demographic measures
Age was measured as a continuous variable. Race and political orientation were measured categorically and dummy coded. Gender was measured as male or female.
Study 1: Results
Two regression models assessed how religious fundamentalism, orthodoxy, religious immanence, intrinsic religiosity, devotionalism, age, gender, race, and political affiliation relate to aggravator and mitigator endorsement. Univariate and multivariate normality and linearity analyses revealed no violations or threats. Data inspection indicated residuals were normally distributed and residual variance was homogenous. No incidents of colinearity were revealed and no outliers were removed. Prior to final analyses (N = 400), missing data analysis suggested no evidence to reject the assumption that missing data were missing at random (MAR); therefore; cases with missing data were excluded (n = 30). All continuous predictor variables were mean-centred (see Table 3 for correlations).
Mitigators
The overall model for mitigator endorsement was significant, F(15, 384) = 3.10, R 2 = .07, R Note. DEVO = devotionalism; INT = intrinsic religiosity; ORTH = orthodoxy; RFS = religious fundamentalism; RI = religious immanence. Notes. DEVO = devotionalism; INT = intrinsic religiosity; ORTH = orthodoxy; RFS = religious fundamentalism; RI = religious immanence. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
were related to mitigator endorsement (see Table 4 for all unstandardised beta coefficients and standard errors).
Aggravators
The overall model for aggravator endorsement was significant, F(15, 384) = 5.51, R 2 = .11, R 2 adj: = .08, p < .001. Orthodoxy, p < .001, religious immanence, p = .01, and age, p = .03, were positively related to aggravator endorsement. Intrinsic religiosity was negatively related to aggravator endorsement, p = .01. No other variables were related to aggravator endorsement (See Table 4 ).
Study 1: Discussion
The purpose of Study 1 was to assess the relationships between religious and demographic characteristics, particularly fundamentalism, and aggravator and mitigator endorsement. Fundamentalism was related to less mitigator endorsement but unrelated to aggravator endorsement (Hypothesis 1 not supported; Hypothesis 2 supported). In this case, fundamentalism might be related to punitiveness because fundamentalists believe in a punishment equal to a moral violation. Because a person committed a murder, evidence reducing an equal punishment is rejected. Thus, fundamentalists might be more likely to render the death penalty than non-fundamentalists because they discount the role of mitigators, not because they are more supportive of aggravators. Orthodoxy and intrinsic religiosity might also relate to death sentencing decisions due to their association with aggravators. Orthodox believers might be prone to choose a death sentence, but intrinsically religious people might be prone to choose a life sentence. Demographic factors were also related to aggravators and mitigators, consistent with previous literature, such that being older was related to higher aggravator endorsement and being republican was related to lower mitigator endorsement.
STUDY 2
The purpose of Study 2 is to extend the results of Study 1 by assessing death qualified mock jurors' decisions in a mock trial context. Study 2 specifically assesses the extent to which fundamentalist beliefs relate to death penalty decisions mediated by aggravator and mitigator weighing and also assesses whether this indirect relationship differs between high aggravator and high mitigator cases. When the case contains more aggravators than mitigators, a death sentence is a likely outcome whether jurors discount mitigators or not; in contrast, when the case contains more mitigators than aggravators, fundamentalists might be less likely to render a life sentence than non-fundamentalists specifically because they discount or reject the mitigators in the case. Study 2 is critical to the current literature because much of the previous research relates fundamentalist beliefs to death penalty support, which is attitudinal and not behavioural, and the research that does include mock jurors' decisions overemphasises verdicts without assessing evidence evaluation (Winter & Vallano, 2015) . Thus, prior research concludes that fundamentalists make more punitive death sentencing decisions because they are simply punitive. No explanatory mechanism within the evidence evaluation process has been presented or tested as of yet. This study provides the first test while also using an experimental method to vary the evidence composition presented in the second phase of a death penalty case. In Study 2, we test four additional hypotheses:
1. Religious fundamentalism will be related to a lower likelihood of choosing a life sentence over a death sentence. 2. The relationship between religious fundamentalism and death penalty sentencing will be mediated by evidence evaluation, such that fundamentalism will be negatively related to weighing mitigators over aggravators and weighing mitigators over aggravators will be positively related to the likelihood of choosing a life sentence over a death sentence. 3. The relationship between religious fundamentalism and evidence evaluation will be moderated by evidence condition, such that fundamentalism will be negatively related to weighing mitigators over aggravators when more mitigators are present but non-significant when more aggravators are present. 4. The overall indirect effect of fundamentalism on death penalty sentencing will be moderated by evidence condition, such that the indirect effect will be significant when more mitigators are present but non-significant when more aggravators are present.
Study 2: Methods

Subjects
Participants were 202 Amazon MTurk workers (paid $3.00 for participation) who identified as religious and were death qualified according to standards promulgated by Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) , Wainwright v. Witt (1985) , and Morgan v. Illinois (1992; see Lynch & Haney, 2009) . Participants who were not religious (i.e., atheists and agnostics; N = 187) and/or were not death qualified (N = 108) were excluded from the sample. An a priori power analysis suggests a sample of N = 135 is necessary to detect a medium effect with a power of 0.80 and a = .05; thus, the current sample size of N = 202 is sufficient. The study took approximately 30 min and participants' time to completion was not monitored, and thus, completion time was not used to screen out any participants. Participants were required to have a 95% or greater approval rating and have had completed at least 500 human intelligence tasks; these requirements ensure high-quality data equal to or better than the use of attention checks (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014) . Participants were 49.50% female, 36.5 years old on average (Mdn = 34.0), 81.6% White (8.0% African American; 5.0% Hispanic; 3.5% Asian American; and 2.0% other), 41.6% Protestant/Christian (23.3% Catholic; 22.3% Believe in God but have no particular affiliation; 4.0% Jewish; 2.5% Buddhist; 1.5% Hindu; and 5.0% other), and 38.6% liberal (33.2% moderate and 28.2% conservative).
Procedure
Participants first answered death qualification questions and were then randomly assigned to an evidence condition (high aggravators or high mitigators).
1 Next, participants read a trial description, judge's instructions, and closing arguments for both the prosecution and defence based on a real capital case from North Carolina (State v. Daniels, 1994). Participants then identified and weighed aggravators and mitigators, chose a sentence for the defendant, and filled out a subset of religious measures.
Materials
The trial description was a 1,900-word summary based on an actual case (State v. Daniels, 1994) and used in previous research (Miller & Bornstein, 2006; Miller, Wood, & Chomos, 2014 ). The crime summary described a man who was in need of money. He initially was confronted by his girlfriend and pushed her down. He then left and went to his aunt's house. There, he asked for money, and when his aunt refused, he strangled her. Then, he went back to his house and used a hammer to strike his girlfriend in the head several times. His neighbour then confronted him, and the defendant yelled at him and threatened his life.
Evidence conditions included high mitigators (N = 101) and high aggravators (N = 101). The high mitigators condition included four statutory mitigators and two statutory aggravators present in the trial description. The high aggravators condition included four statutory aggravators and two statutory mitigators present in the trial description. Per Lockett v. Ohio, 1978, participants were also given the opportunity to identify and endorse any other non-statutory mitigator.
Evidence evaluation was assessed by asking the participants to, 'Please indicate the extent to which you believe that the mitigating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances [. . .] '. This was measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 (mitigating circumstances absolutely DO NOT outweigh aggravating circumstances) to 7 (mitigating circumstances absolutely DO outweigh aggravating circumstances). Religious measures from Study 1 were used in Study 2, and all items were rated on a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). These included religious fundamentalism (a = .96), devotionalism (a = .92), orthodoxy (a = .90), immanence (a = .78), 2 and intrinsic religiosity (a = .85; see Table 5 for Ms and SDs). Sentence was measured dichotomously, either life in prison or the death penalty. Demographic factors were measured the same as in Study 1, except political orientation was included instead of political affiliation, and it was measured on a Likerttype scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative).
Study 2: Results
Hayes' (2013) PROCESS Macro was used to test moderated mediation with religious fundamentalism predicting sentencing mediated by evidence evaluation and moderated by evidence condition. Residual bootstrapping (5,000 samples) was used to construct a confidence interval for the hypothesised conditional indirect effect. Data inspection indicated residuals were normally distributed and residual variance was homogenous. There was no evidence of multicollinearity and no outliers were removed. Missing data were analysed, and there was no evidence to reject the assumption that missing data were missing at random; therefore, cases with missing data were excluded from final analyses (n = 8).
The moderated mediation regression analysis consisted of two steps.
Step 1 included an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in which religious fundamentalism (religious and demographic), control variables, evidence condition, and the interaction between religious fundamentalism and evidence condition predicted the mediator, evidence Notes. AGGMIT = weighing mitigators over aggravators; DEVO = devotionalism; INT = intrinsic religiosity; ORTH = orthodoxy; RFS = religious fundamentalism; RI = religious immanence.
evaluation.
Step 2 included a binary logistic regression model in which religious fundamentalism, control variables, and the mediating variable, evidence evaluation, predicted sentencing. The indirect effect and conditional indirect effect were then assessed. In step 1, the overall model was significant, F(13, 188) = 3.41, R 2 = .19, p < .001. Both the evidence condition and religious fundamentalism were significantly related to weighing mitigators over aggravators. Moreover, the interaction between religious fundamentalism and evidence condition was significant (p = .04), such that religious fundamentalism was negatively related to weighing mitigators over aggravators, but only in the high mitigator condition (see Figure 1 ; see Table 6 for beta coefficients).
In step 2, religious fundamentalism, control variables, and evidence evaluation predicted sentencing. Goodness of fit analyses indicated adequate model fit, X 2 (12) = 88.13, p < .001; Hosmer and Lemeshow test, X 2 (8) = 3.23, p = .92; À2LL (12, 189) = 140.15; CoxSnell (12, 189) = .35; and Nagelkerke (12, 189) = .52. Only evidence evaluation was significantly related to sentence (p < .001), such that weighing mitigators over aggravators was related to a higher likelihood of choosing a life sentence over the death penalty (see Table 6 ). Overall, 74.8% of participants chose a life sentence.
The indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on sentence, mediated by evidence evaluation, was significant, coefficient = À.43, SE boot = .22, 95% CI boot = (À0.85, À0.02) (see Figure 2) . Because the evidence condition moderated the relationship between fundamentalism and evidence evaluation in step 1, moderated mediation was assessed via the index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015) , but it was not significant, Index = .30, SE boot = .19, 95% CI boot = (À.06, 0.68). Therefore, the indirect path between religious fundamentalism and death penalty sentencing through evidence evaluation was not moderated by evidence condition.
Study 2: Discussion
In study 2, religious fundamentalism predicted a lower likelihood of choosing a life sentence (Hypothesis 3 supported), and this was explained by the negative relationship between religious fundamentalism and weighing mitigators over aggravators when also controlling for demographic factors and political orientation (Hypothesis 4 supported). The relationship between fundamentalism and evidence evaluation was also partly dependent upon the evidence condition, primarily occurring when the case contained more mitigators than aggravators. (Hypothesis 5 supported) . However, the overall mediating effect of evidence evaluation was not contingent upon the evidence condition Step 2, the 95% CI refers to the Exp(B) in which a 1.00 is equivalent to a 0 in 95% CIs for betas in linear regression. For race, Caucasian American is the reference group. AGGMIT = weighing mitigators over aggravators; DEVO = devotionalism; EVIDENCE = evidence condition (high mitigators = 0; high aggravators = 1); INT = intrinsic religiosity; ORTH = orthodoxy; RFS = religious fundamentalism; RI = religious immanence. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Figure 2 . Full mediation model with evidence evaluation mediating the relationship between religious fundamentalism and sentencing decisions. Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
(Hypothesis 6 not supported). These results suggest the link between religious fundamentalism and death penalty sentencing noted in the literature (Miller & Hayward, 2008) is likely the result of biased weighing of aggravators and mitigators in the penalty phase of the trial. Fundamentalists' religious moral identities and beliefs act as scripts when deciding punishments for criminal behaviour, and evidence is likely evaluated in ways consistent with the prescribed outcomes. This supports confirmation bias and motivated reasoning.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current studies assessed the underlying explanation as to why religious fundamentalism is related to punitiveness in death penalty sentencing. Several researchers suggest that fundamentalists are more punitive because they believe in an 'eye for an eye' doctrine constituting the death penalty as a just and appropriate punishment for murder (Grasmick, Cochran, et al., 1993; Miller, 2013; Miller & Hayward, 2008) . This doctrine is directly tied to fundamentalists' moral and religious identities and implies that if a person is found guilty of murder, then that person should receive the death penalty. This is based on a conditional statement of logical equivalency and leaves no room for a reduced consequence. If an eye is taken, then an eye should be given. According to this doctrine, there are no intervening circumstances that reduce the consequence -the act of murder establishes a threshold for equal punishment (i.e., the death penalty). In line with this framework, results of the current studies suggest that fundamentalism is positively associated with rendering a death sentence because fundamentalists are less supportive of, and give less weight to, mitigating circumstances that formally make a defendant less deserving of a death sentence.
Although fundamentalists appear resistant to evidence that would deem murder less worthy of the death penalty, they seem to evaluate aggravating circumstances similarly to non-fundamentalists. This is also consistent with the threshold approach to understanding the relationship between fundamentalism and death sentencing. For example, a person commits murder, which is the critical threshold for a death sentence according to the fundamentalist belief of an 'eye for an eye'. Because this threshold is met, variation in aggravating circumstances is essentially irrelevant to the death penalty decision. This result is consistent with previous research that finds conservative Protestantism to be associated with reduced discrimination of wrongfulness across different types of crimes (Curry, 1996) . Essentially, the act of committing the crime determines the wrongfulness, not necessarily the additional information about the particular crime committed. For capital crimes, the crime committed (i.e., capital murder) determines the appropriate punishment (i.e., execution), and the additional information (i.e., aggravating circumstances) does not necessarily deem that sentencing decision more valid. However, information contradicting the simple directive (i.e., mitigating circumstances) cannot negate the directive and is, therefore, refuted.
The threshold approach to understanding the 'eye for an eye' doctrine of fundamentalism can be understood in the context of religious moral identity and motivated reasoning and confirmation bias. When making judgements of right and wrong, identity theory suggests that individuals' relevant identities are salient and guide decisions and evaluations of information. Fundamentalists subscribe to a moral identity based on fundamentalist religious principles related to judgements of right and wrong. These principles include the doctrine of an eye for an eye; thus, fundamentalists are most likely to engage moral scripts associated with such doctrine when judgements of right and wrong are in question.
Capital cases require judgements of right and wrong in the sentencing phase of the trial. If a defendant is found guilty, which was the case in this particular mock juror study, fundamentalists' religious identity would indicate that the appropriate decision would be the death penalty, according to the eye for an eye doctrine. However, the evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would confront fundamentalists with a legally based but morally constraining definition of how to arrive at a punishment. The legally appropriate way of determining a death sentence would be to weigh aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances. If mitigating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh aggravating circumstances, then fundamentalists would be legally bound to abandon their moral identities. To avoid identity abandonment and to compensate, fundamentalists instead devalue mitigating circumstances to skew the overall weighing of evidence in favour of the death penalty, and this occurs through motivated reasoning and confirmation bias. Aggravators are accepted as legally defined, but mitigators are rejected through devaluation or outright refutation. In death penalty cases, identity theory explains the foundation by which individuals high in fundamentalism formulate their sentencing decisions, and confirmation bias explains the specific mechanism by which their evidence evaluations are skewed in favour of these decisions.
The results of this work have implications for prosecuting attorneys, defence attorneys, and trial consultants in capital trials. In general, jurors with fundamentalist beliefs might be reluctant to assign mitigating value to mitigating circumstances. Prosecution can benefit from retaining fundamentalist jurors during voir dire, and at trial, emphasising punishment philosophies such as 'just deserts' while downplaying how mitigating circumstances makes a crime less worthy of the death penalty. This aligns with fundamentalist jurors' beliefs and would likely further convince them of choosing a death sentence. The defence could benefit by striking fundamentalist jurors during voir dire. For example, prospective jurors can be excluded for cause if they report they would automatically render a death sentence (Morgan v. Illinois, 1992) , and thus if fundamentalists are questioned concerning their adherence to the eye for an eye doctrine, their statements could be cited as grounds for removal. Furthermore, at trial, the defence could devote equal time to arguing mitigating evidence and to making counterarguments against aggravating circumstances. Whereas non-fundamentalists might be receptive to mitigators, fundamentalists might be more likely to be swayed by exposing holes in the prosecution's proffered theory.
The implications of this research might be particularly salient for jurisdictions with a substantial proportion of religious fundamentalists in the jury pool. According to the 2010-2016 General Social Survey data, the south central and south Atlantic regions have the highest proportion of fundamentalists, particularly the eastern south central region (50% identify as fundamentalists). Moreover, religious fundamentalists are more likely to be death qualified (Summers, Hayward, & Miller, 2010) , and thus, a petit capital jury might be disproportionately composed of religious fundamentalists compared to the jury pool in many jurisdictions. Therefore, attorneys in these jurisdictions might be especially mindful of this research when trying death penalty cases before a jury.
Finally, it is worth emphasising the constitutional implications of this work. In the 1970s in the United States, the death penalty was deemed unconstitutional in large part because jurors' unbridled discretion resulted in 'wantonly' imposed death sentences (Furman v. Georgia, 1972) . To address juror discretion, sentencing guidelines were adopted that instruct jurors to endorse and weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence in making a death penalty decision (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976; Paternoster, Brame, & Bacon, 2008) . The U.S. Supreme Court then deemed the death penalty constitutional because these guidelines -specifically, aggravating and mitigating circumstances -circumscribe death sentences (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976) . In other words, death sentences are constitutional insofar as they rendered as a result of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a case. Results from the current studies are troubling, then, because they suggest fundamentalists might not render death sentences in the manner prescribed by the Supreme Court. We have focused on how fundamentalist jurors might reject mitigating evidence, but it also important to note that fundamentalists might fail to differentiate cases in terms of aggravation. The Supreme Court stressed that aggravating evidence is meant to 'narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punishment' (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 427) , but fundamentalist jurors who adhere to the eye for an eye doctrine might be unwilling to differentiate murderers.
Limitations and conclusions
Limitations of the current research include using a mock decision-making paradigm; verisimilitude is weak and consequentiality is relatively low (Bornstein et al., 2017; Lieberman, Krauss, Heen, & Sakiyama, 2016) . Because the evidence is only described in text, the impact might be weak compared to realistic evidence (such as graphic photographs, actual weapons, and professional presentations), which might elicit stronger reactions from jurors resulting in different weights given to aggravating and mitigating evidence evaluations. The samples used in this research include students (Study 1) and MTurk workers (Study 2). Though these samples (particularly MTurk workers) are comparable to more generalisable samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015; Necka, Cacioppo, Norman, & Cacioppo, 2016) , they lack realistic representation of a venire pool. Another limitation is the use of correlational data and predominantly Judeo-Christian measures, which were chosen to best address the religious beliefs of an American sample. The use of experimental designs and more generalised religious measures might better account for causal differences in religious beliefs in more diverse samples. Future research should address these limitations. Lastly, this study did not include jury deliberations. Studies of deliberating juries show that evidence evaluation predicts death sentencing (Baldus et al., 2002; Richards et al., 2016) . If fundamentalism predicts biased evidence weighing in deliberations, then one might generally expect a main effect of evidence strength, predicted by fundamentalism, on individual and group sentences. That said, some studies suggest jurors can embellish aggravators and mitigators during deliberation (Lynch & Haney, 2015) . Therefore, deliberation might exacerbate the fundamentalismverdict relationship. Deliberations might also act as a filter for extreme views and reduce the strength of the fundamentalism-verdict relationship. Further, if including deliberations, a group process, then group-level fundamentalism would need to be assessed in addition to individual fundamentalism. Future research should examine the role of deliberations in juror verdicts while assessing the extent to which fundamentalist beliefs predict evidence evaluations.
The current research provides the first evidence explaining the relationship between fundamentalist beliefs and punitive death penalty decision-making. Specifically, fundamentalists are more likely to vote for the death penalty due to reduced value placed on mitigating circumstances. The devaluation of evidence is consistent with confirmation bias and motivated by rigid religious identities associated with fundamentalist beliefs. At a very basic level, this research suggests that beliefs associated with punishment relate to differences in people's perceptions of evidence, which can potentially have significant consequences for defendants and their families. Where individuals derive their identity can determine their decisions and how they interpret evidence to support such decisions. Jurors are not excluded from such processes. It would behoove judges and attorneys to at least consider religious beliefs when predicting how jurors might evaluate and interpret evidence presented in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial.
